This page contains recent working papers on network formation and the game theoretic network analysis.
Nash Equilibria of Network Formation Games under Consent (Revised)
by Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti ans Sudipta Sarangi
May 2011, revised: November 2011
Abstract:
We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.
November 2011 version of this paper: GCS2011
Network Formation under Mutual Consent and Costly Communication
by Robert P. Gilles and Sudipta Sarangi
October 2009, revised: July 2010, published: 2010
Abstract:
We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson-Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable network that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.
October 2009 version of the paper: Gilles-Sarangi (2009)
Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks
by Edward Droste, Robert P. Gilles and Cathleen Johnson
April 2000
Abstract:
We analyze the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game where both the actions of the players and the communication network evolve over time. Cost considerations of social interaction are incorporated by considering a circular model with endogenous neighborhoods, meaning that the locations of the players are fixed but players can create their own communication network.
The dynamic process describing medium-run behavior is shown to converge to an absorbing state, which may be characterized by coexistence of conventions. In the long run, when mistake probabilities are small but nonvanishing, coexistence of conventions is no longer sustainable as the risk-dominant convention becomes the unique stochastically stable state.